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Territorial autonomy is one aspect of power-sharing in multi-ethnic societies. Nevertheless, 
the multi-ethnic countries of Central and Eastern Europe are still among the most centralised 
in the European Union (EU). This article analyses the failure of any attempts to establish 
(symmetric) federalism or (asymmetric) autonomy, creating self-governed regions by the 
Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia. The analysis focuses on positions of the main 
parties of the ethnic majorities and the Hungarian minority parties in the two countries. In 
both cases, the parties representing the Hungarian minorities have favoured territorial 
autonomy along ethnic lines, but this demand has been rejected by the parties of the ethnic 
majority. Against the historical legacy of unstable borders, the latter argue that territorial 
autonomy or federalisation might be a first step for a revisionist agenda and separatism. 
Instead, supported by the European integration, the parties have been able to agree on 
decentralisation as a half-hearted compromise. 
 
Introduction1 
The start of multi-party democracy in post-communist Europe also ended the era of 
the federalist systems in the region – Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. All formerly federal states dissolved and additionally, post-
communist states inherited the highly centralised state structure from the former regimes. The 
process of European integration has not been able to change this picture: it has induced 
gradual decentralisation, but far-reaching territorial reforms, any kind of federalism or 
territorial autonomies remain taboo (Keating 2003; Yoder 2003; Kirchner 1999b; 
Swianiewicz 2010).2 This paper aims to explain the lack of federal states in post-communist 
Europe.  
Prompted by a number of territorial reforms in Western Europe, the comparative 
politics literature has increasingly become interested in regionalism and federalism (Keating 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements omitted. XXX 
2 See also Brusis in this issue. 
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1998; Hooghe et al. 2010; Hough and Jeffery 2006; Swenden 2006). Political parties feature 
at the forefront of these studies, as they are the main actors who are pushing for territorial 
reforms. The literature on territorial reforms in Central and Eastern Europe mainly focuses on 
the EU as the principal driving force, with a limited but significant impact in encouraging 
territorial re-organisation. The EU has supported administrative decentralisation to ensure 
effective governance and the establishment of institutions for the implementation of EU 
regional policies (Hughes et al. 2004; Brusis 2005; Dobre 2009, 2010; Kirchner 1999a). The 
role of domestic partisan actors in these reforms has only been analysed by a few studies 
(Ertugal and Dobre 2011; O'Dwyer 2006). Therefore, the purpose of this article is to bring in 
the perspective of political parties and analyse their positions on territorial reforms.  
In the theoretical part of this study, we argue that the historical legacies of the pre-
communist and communist regimes together with Europeanisation explain the party positions 
on territorial reforms in Central and Eastern Europe3 and the actual outcome of territorial 
reforms. After the communist period has lead to a considerable centralisation of the counties, 
European integration has thereafter prescribed the decentralisation and the regionalisation of 
the candidate states. The parties of ethnic minorities that live concentrated in a minority-
majority area usually advocate territorial reforms that would give them some autonomy. In 
contrast, the mainstream parties – attracting mainly the voters of the majority – have reacted 
with massive resistance, and hindered the process of regionalisation.4 This encompasses both 
nationalist parties of the majority, but also moderate or civic parties, which are not defined 
based on ethnic exclusivity. 
As none of the ethnically divided countries in the region has a significant territorial 
political conflict that would divide the mainstream parties, the regionalisation issue is mainly 
                                                 
3 We use this as a synonym for post-communist countries in Europe.  
4 We understand territorial reforms as the re-organisation of public administrations based on new territorial 
divisions that potentially include the transfer of competencies to sub-national levels, which were previously 
inexistent or irrelevant. 
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linked to the ethnic question. Drawing on the pre-communist legacies of multi-ethnic empires 
and unstable borders, nationalist parties of the ethnic majority warn that regionalist demands 
are a revisionist plan for border change and separatism. As nationalist parties capitalise on the 
issue of national integrity, civic (non-nationalist) parties supported by the majority cannot 
make substantial concessions to ethnic minorities in this field, without risking losing their 
voters to the nationalist opponents. Given the scepticism of the mainstream parties, the most 
likely outcome of any reform is a decentralisation process on a symmetric and non-ethnic 
basis. 
Empirically, this study analyses the territorial reforms in two new, multinational EU 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe: Slovakia and Romania in the post-
communist period (Romania: since 1990, Slovakia: 1994) until 2011. Both countries have 
significant and partly territorially concentrated Hungarian minorities that are represented by 
their own ethnic parties, while electoral competition across ethnic lines is almost absent. The 
two cases stand exemplary for a debate which might plausibly have affected or affect other 
countries of the region, such as Serbia, Macedonia, or Moldova, in a similar fashion, on their 
way to EU membership. In our analysis, we focus on the positions of the most important 
political parties on issues of regionalisation or territorial autonomy, and how they evolved, as 
a consequence of agreements over governmental coalitions. Our qualitative analysis is based 
on newspaper articles, secondary academic sources, interviews with actors and experts, the 
analysis of party manifestos, and the results of an expert survey.  
The next, theoretical section links the sensitivity of ethno-territorial solutions to the 
historical legacy of these countries. It argues that symmetric and non-ethnic decentralisation is 
the only viable compromise which the domestic actors can agree on, given the pressure from 
the EU. This is followed by an empirical section, which describes the party positions with 
regard to regionalisation, and discusses the reforms that were implemented.  
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Historical legacies: Contested Borders and Territories  
Central and Eastern Europe has a rich and plural ethnic heritage. As a result of the 
transformation of multi-ethnic empires – Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire – 
in the aftermath of the First World War and the transformation of the state borders, the new 
states that emerged in the early 20th century were usually ethnically diverse (Caramani 2003). 
After borders were moved or established, the areas of the periphery were particularly 
ethnically heterogeneous, or settled by dominant ethnic minorities. The large national 
minorities that live concentrated in territories present an ideal premise for power-sharing 
solutions, with multi-level government and strong constitutional regions, based on symmetric 
federalism, or an (asymmetric) ethno-territorial autonomy solution.5 Political representatives 
of ethnic minorities saw the democratic transformation of their countries as an opportunity to 
realise group-specific rights but also self-rule for their home territories. 
However, territorial government can also be seen through a nationalist lens, with 
reference to historical battles. While state borders were accepted on paper, in countries that 
lost territories in the past like Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria or Turkey, sentiments of 
'irredentism' (the desire to get ‘lost territories’ back) prevailed in people's minds, creating the 
potential for a revisionist agenda. In newly created countries, state boundaries appeared to be 
fragile as in Czechoslovakia, and induced the sentiment that these new parts of the country 
needed to be nationalised (see also Brubaker et al. 2006). Therefore, partisan actors can 
construct the picture that national unity is endangered, thus making territorial autonomy a 
sensitive political issue. This strategy capitalises on the presence of minorities, if they can be 
portrayed as potentially disloyal to the host state and willing to join an ethnic kin state. The 
argument goes that territorial autonomy for minorities might endanger state unity, especially 
in border areas disputed (more or less explicitly) between states. 
                                                 
5 The term ethno-territorial autonomy is used for (symmetric or asymmetric) autonomous regions, whose 
boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines. 
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This apprehension was bolstered by the federal experience of other countries in the 
region. After the communist period, the political-administrative systems of the region were 
highly centralised and episodes of regional autonomy proved short-lived: the only three 
countries with a federal structure were the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, all of which broke up. After their dissolution, they served as 
an example that federalism or regional autonomies might be the first step towards separatism 
and the break-up of states. The post-communist transition has shown how quickly all these 
federal countries have fallen apart along previous or constructed ethnic lines, followed by 
secessionist wars in the case of the former Soviet Union (Zürcher et al. 2005). 
The historical changes of 1989-90 also created new states, which needed to define 
their national identity and assert their territory. Ethnic heterogeneity, or the unresolved status 
of ethnic minorities, were important challenges to realising these objectives, and the 
relationship between kin states and their external minorities did not help to resolve these 
problems (Csergő and Deegan-Krause 2011). Ethnic and nationalist issues have become 
politically salient all across countries in the region (Evans and Whitefield 2000), and 
incorporated into their party systems (Birnir 2007; Bochsler 2010). Nationalist issues are 
easily instrumentalised by parties with a majority-nationalist agenda. This explains the 
behaviour of the actors of the ethnic majority towards minority rights. While any 
strengthening of minority rights will be attacked by nationalists, territorial reforms are 
particularly sensitive, as they are seen through historical lenses of contested borders and 
territory. The (potential) agitation of the nationalists on this salient issue also pressures the 
more moderate mainstream parties not to make substantial concessions with regards to 
territorial autonomy (see also Meguid 2005). 
6 
 
 
Decentralisation as EU conditionality 
In spite of these strong historical legacies, and the fragile and deeply political nature of 
national identity and territory in Central and Eastern Europe, the governments of this region 
have been sensitive to the driving influence of the European Union in putting territorial-
administrative reforms onto the political agenda. The Commission has placed the creation and 
empowerment of the regional level of administration (Keating 2003: 58; Hughes et al. 2003: 
73), necessary for receiving, managing and implementing the Structural and Cohesion Fund 
programmes, at the heart of the accession criteria established during accession negotiations. 
These funding programs require administrative capacities at the regional level, in 
correspondence with the EU’s units of the territorial statistics (NUTS)6 (Marek and Baun 
2002: 897-9). The Commission, however, did not specify the institutional form of the regional 
layer of public administration. In particular, it did not demand that the regional institutions 
established for the implementation of the structural funds need directly to correspond to the 
already existing regional public administrations. Also, the Commission disagreed internally as 
to whether regionalisation should have a political dimension and whether regional 
governments should be directly elected (Brusis 2002; Hughes et al. 2004: 80-4). Moreover, 
the Commission’s approach shifted over the time. After a first period, where it stressed the 
political dimension of regionalisation, it moved toward a technocratic approach, which 
included only the formal adoption of the acquis communautaire and focused on the 
administrative capacity for the absorption of the funds. Thereafter, the Commission started to 
support central control, since it was seen as more effective, efficient and less prone to 
corruption {Hughes, 2004 #5830@85-117}.  
The protection of minorities was part of the political accession criteria as well and, 
therefore, the EU has been understood as an actor lobbying on behalf of national minorities in 
                                                 
6 Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics 
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Central and Eastern Europe (Jenne 2004). We argue, however, that the influences of the 
European Union have to be differentiated. The EU did not support territorial autonomy as a 
mean for minority protection. Therefore, it did not strengthen the bargaining power of the 
minority parties toward the majority parties in their quest for territorial autonomy.7 According 
to its strategy of consensual conflict settlement, the EU supported the inclusion of ethnic 
minority parties in the governments in Romania and Slovakia. Yet, since it did not have a 
preferred institutional solution, it did not intervene in internal disputes about the formulation 
of minority rights or regionalisation projects (Brusis 2003: 12-3; Sasse 2005: 17). Once pro-
European integration parties got in office – in 1996 in Romania and in 1998 in Slovakia - the 
EU was able to exert pressures for initiating the process of decentralisation. But, the right 
territorial solution, the competences of regional governments, and their institutional form 
remained the responsibility of the domestic actors.8 
Drawing on the influence of historical legacies and European integration on political 
parties’ positions towards territorial reforms, we summarise our argument: While territorial 
autonomy is a political goal of the ethnic minority parties, it is not negotiable for the parties of 
the majority. Due to the fragile and contested nature of their statehood and nationhood, 
nationalist parties of the ethnic majority identify territorial autonomy as a first step to 
separatism or irredentism. Non-nationalist parties cannot make substantial concessions on this 
issue, without risking losing voters to the nationalist majority parties. But, under pressure 
from the European Union to reform the territorial organisation of their state, mainstream 
parties will undertake the process of regionalisation. However, given the ideological 
                                                 
7 The EU and the NATO pressured accession candidates with internal and external minorities to sign basic 
treaties which obliged them to recognise each other’s territorial integrity and political independence and to 
protect their minorities. Romania and Hungary signed basic treaties that included the 1201 recommendation of 
the Council of Europe, which entails collective rights for ethnic minorities as a minority protection measure. 
However, in a footnote of the treaty the possibility of establishing territorial autonomy was explicitly excluded 
(Roper 2000: 121; Eplényi 2006: 64-5; Csergő 2002: 17).  
 
8 NATO adopted a similar approach for its enlargement process (Ram 2003: 35). 
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constraints of mainstream parties, the only political feasible outcome is an symmetrical form 
of regional government, that is weakly decentralised and whose boundaries do not correspond 
with the presence of ethnic groups.  
 
Slovakia and Romania 
The cases of Romania and Slovakia are interesting to investigate, given the similar 
conditions they share(e.g. Csergő 2007). First, the ethnic minority groups are territorially 
concentrated in both countries. In Slovakia, the Hungarians live in the South, and are a 
majority along the border with Hungary. The Hungarian minority of Romania lives in 
Transylvania in the North-West of the country, and represents the majority in two counties in 
the Carpathian basin, in the heart of Romania. Moreover, the sizeable Hungarian minority 
groups and the kin-state activism of Hungary, have often been perceived as the common 
external threat to the territorial integrity of both states.9 Slovakia is a new nation state, seeking 
to build a new identity after the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1994, while Romania has 
existed previously within the same borders. However, in both countries the ethnic Hungarian 
minority has been spurred on by a new wave of (irrendentist) nationalist politics in Hungary 
and ethnic Hungarian parties have had to contend with the adversarial nationalist postures of 
certain domestic mainstream parties. 
Second, in the two countries, ethnic cleavages are clearly institutionalised in the party 
system, and cross-ethnic voting exists only to a minimal degree. The number of ethnic 
Hungarian voters voting for non-Hungarian parties is negligible, and until the emerging of 
Most-Híd, a cross-ethnic, but Hungarian-dominated party in Slovakia (Szöcsik and Bochsler 
2012), none of the Hungarian parties received any support beyond their ethnic group. The 
ethnic divide also defines the territorial splits in the party systems. Hungarian minority parties 
                                                 
9 Especially, nationalist-conservative governments in Budapest have defined the support for ethnic Hungarians in 
neighbouring countries as one of the priorities on their foreign policy agenda (Horváth 2004: 33-4), and tried to 
ally with Hungarian minority parties in Romania and Slovakia (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2012).   
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are present solely in the areas with Hungarian settlement and are therefore effectively regional 
parties. Parties supported by the ethnic majority receive support throughout the country, apart 
from the Hungarian-settled areas. Further, the urban-rural division, between the post-
Communists (rural) and the liberal parties (urban) of Romania in the 1990s has mainly 
vanished. Lastly, ethnic minority and mainstream parties compete on a programmatic basis, 
as the positions that they adopt are responsive not only to the voters' demands (Roberts 2009), 
but also to other parties' strategic moves (Tavits 2008). While for mainstream parties, other 
dimensions – such as economic or liberal-authoritarian questions – are important, ethnic 
minority parties tend to be defined to a lower degree on these questions. Both for the 
majorities and the minorities, positioning along ethno-nationalist issue-dimension, which are 
salient in both countries (Evans and Need 2002), matters for party electoral and governing 
strategies.  
We show how party positions on these issues developed, and argue that the nationalist 
parties' campaigns on these issues have prevented the more moderate mainstream parties from 
making too pronounced policy moves. In the following sections, we identify the main reforms 
that took place in our two cases, and look at the positions of ethnic minority parties and the 
reaction of the parties of the majority.  
Romania 
Territorial reforms 
 Romania has a strong centralist tradition. While the new Constitution of 1991 defines 
Romania as a unitary and indivisible nation state, significant steps towards decentralisation 
were taken following the change of regime. Based on the Constitution, two layers with legal 
authority and various administrative structures of local government were institutionalised at 
the level of counties (judeţe) and local administrations. The local administrative units have 
directly elected authorities, while the county authorities co-exist with de-concentrated units of 
central government. Until 1996, there was no system of regional government, and only some 
10 
 
tentative first steps towards decentralisation were taken (Ertugal and Dobre 2011: 1200-2). 
In 1996, competences were shifted to the 41 counties which represent the intermediary 
level tier of government. In 1998, eight development regions were created, by associating four 
to six counties, but not changing the order of the sub-national administration substantially 
(Ertugal and Dobre 2011: 1213; Dobre 2010: 62). The regions were established to correspond 
to the NUTS II10 level divisions and were brought together for statistical purposes and for the 
management and implementation of pre-accession and structural funds (Hughes et al. 2004: 
57-8). They remain largely fictive, ahistorical regions with no political or fiscal powers, 
Regional Development Councils, that elaborate the development strategy of the region are 
composed of local elected representatives. In 2006, a new reform was introduced with the aim 
of reinforcing administrative and financial decentralisation at the local level (Ertugal and 
Dobre 2011: 1208). 
 
Ethnic minority parties 
 The organisation of the Hungarians in Romania, UDMR, was originally founded in 
1989 as an umbrella organisation. It evolved into the main party of the Hungarian minority,11 
in opposition until 1996, and was thereafter included in governmental coalitions.  
The UDMR's first serious attempt to realise a comprehensive system of autonomy 
rights was the elaboration of a draft bill on national minorities and autonomous communities 
which it submitted to parliament in 1993, but thereafter rejected. Nonetheless, in 1995 an 
internal committee of the UDMR elaborated a draft statute on Szeklerland's autonomy (for the 
region with a dominant Hungarian minority), but this was not submitted to parliament and 
remained a solitary initiative for many years (Bakk 2004a: 43-50). This goal was however 
marginalised within the UDMR, after the party joined the government in 1996 – an oversized 
coalition which did not need the support of the UDMR (Horváth 2004: 46). Territorial 
                                                 
10 NUTS II refers to the territorial subdivisions within EU member states. 
11 Without being legally registered as a party. 
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autonomy remained a central claim of the UDMR's programme, but the demand had to be 
relinquished in exchange for the party’s inclusion into executive power – the controversial 
issue was not negotiable for coalition partners (see below). 
After 2000, UDMR stayed in coalition with the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and 
neglected the issue of autonomy, which fuelled internal conflicts (Bochsler and 
Szöcsik 2012). From 2000 onwards, alternative Hungarian political organisations were 
formed by dissident members of the UDMR. Two political pressure organisations emerged, 
the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (CNMT) and the Szekler National Council 
(CNT) between 2003 and 2004. Since 2008, the UDMR is challenged by the Hungarian Civic 
Party (PCM) and since 2011 by the CNMT that transformed to a party, the Hungarian 
People’s Party of Transylvania in the electoral arena. The common criticism of these 
organisations was that the UDMR was selling out the interests of the Hungarians in 
government. Their main goal therefore was to put the issue of autonomy on the political 
agenda and ultimately to establish a system of cultural and territorial autonomy (Eplényi 
2006: 65-7). However, both new Hungarian minority parties were only able to mobilise a 
minor part of the Hungarian electorate in the Szekler Land in the local elections in 2008 and 
2012, each of them gaining less than 1% of the national votes. UDMR remains the only party 
of the Hungarian minority in national parliament. 
 Growing political competition within the Hungarian minority has revived the debate on 
autonomy and regionalisation. In February 2004, an autonomy statute of the Szeklerland was 
submitted to the parliament, via a group of MPs belonging to the UDMR, but with informal 
ties to the new dissident Hungarian organisations. This proposal was rejected by the 
mainstream parties. The UDMR reacted with its own idea of transforming existent 
development regions into political-administrative regions, hoping to create the Szeklerland 
Development Region by uniting three counties (Harghita, Covasna and Mureş). This was 
intended as the first step to the establishment of an autonomous Szeklerland (Bakk 2004a: 50-
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4; Eplényi 2006; Bakk and Szász 2010: 24-8). The new Hungarian organisations are 
supporting the UDMR to demand asymmetrical regionalism in which Szeklerland as a 
development region would enjoy special status (Hungarian Council of Transylvania 2010; 
Bakk 2004b).12 The underlying idea is that Szeklerland's territorial autonomy should be 
embedded in a larger regionalisation process of Romania, which is more likely to be 
supported by mainstream parties (Bakk and Szász 2010: 27-8). The UDMR reacted in 2011 
with the demand for a reorganisation of the development regions, but without creating new 
regional units. It could however not agree on a solution with its coalition partner, the PD-L.13  
 
Mainstream parties 
The mainstream party landscape in Romania is divided between the economic left-
wing Social Democratic Party (PSD), the economic right-wing National Liberals (PNL), the 
centrist Democratic Party (PD-L), and the two ultra-national Greater Romania Party (PRM) 
and Romanian Unity Party (PUNR). While the predecessor of the Socialists has been in an 
informal governing coalition with the ultra-nationalists in the mid-1990s, the left-wing and the 
right-wing parties have altered in government since 1996, mostly under inclusion of the 
Hungarian minority.  
The mainstream parties have steadily and unanimously rejected the demand for ethno-
territorial autonomy over time. The nationalist parties PRM and PUNR have a more 
pronounced adversarial positions than the remaining parties. Since the mid-1990s, different 
governmental coalitions have adopted an agenda of decentralisation and especially, the Social 
Democrats have moved from a rather nationalist agenda towards a more accommodative 
stance. Given the high volatility, and constant process of fissures and fusions within the large 
mainstream parties, the analysis can only offer a glimpse of the positions of the largest 
governing parties. We include the positions of the main nationalist parties, however, as they 
                                                 
12 Szeklerland comprises the counties Harghita, Covasna and the half of the county Mureş 
13 Új Magyar Szó, 24 October 2011, "Reformra van szükség, nem káoszra [Reforms are wanted, not chaos]." 
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were represented in parliament over most of the time, and as their adversarial position on 
ethno-territorial issues has strongly affected the debate. 
The most clear-cut allegiances to nationalist and centralist ideas can be found in the 
PUNR and PRM rhetoric and their manifesto.14 The PUNR declared itself as "a nationalist 
party because it defends the Romanian state of law, national, unitary and indivisible according 
to all its citizens’ interests from its entire actual and historical territory." This is reflected in 
the view of the Hungarian minority as "occupant forces", which were breaking the traditional 
democratic Romanian structures (PUNR – 1992). It "opposes any pretence of creating 
territorial-administrative enclaves based on arbitrary criteria, the decision of administrative-
territorial organisation shall be exclusively attributed to the legislative branch" (PUNR – 
1990). The tones of the rivalling nationalist PRM (1992 manifesto) were much the same: 
"Their [the Hungarians'] goal is the dissolution of Romania, step by step. The PRM proposes 
the protection by all means possible of the integrity and sovereignty of the Romanian state, of 
the national and unitary character of the Romanian state." Some of these points were taken up 
by its main coalition partner, the FDSN (which later transformed in the main Social 
Democratic Party, PSD), which expressed its "firm rejection of extremist, chauvinist and 
separatist views” and its resistance "against revisionist, absurd federalisation solutions" 
(FDSN – 1992). This ideological proximity on the ethnic and territorial dimension also 
affected the policies of the government coalition in the early 1990s, as the nationalist parties 
vetoed any regionalisation project or move towards increased minority rights. Most tensions 
rose over the autonomy issue. The two nationalist parties left the coalition over a struggle due 
to the signing of a bilateral treaty with the Hungarian government, which included references 
to minority rights that they did not want to accept (Roper 2000: 120-2). 
                                                 
14 We thank Protsyk and Garaz (forthcoming) and Benoit et al. (2009) for making their analysis and collection of 
party manifestos available to us. Given the small number of statements on territorial reforms, a quantitative 
analysis might not lead to a very reliable picture. We instead use the manifestos for a qualitative illustration of 
our arguments. This also reflects the methodological difficulties in the analysis of minority-related issues in 
common manifesto-based measures (Protsyk and Garaz forthcoming).  
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In 1996, the government swung to the economic centre-right, led by the Democratic 
Convention of Romania (CDR), a formation of economic right-wing oppositional parties, the 
Social Democratic Union (USD) and the party of the Hungarian minority (UDMR). This 
government adopted a somewhat conciliatory stance towards the Hungarian minority, in the 
face of pressure by the EU to increase minority protection. While the government remained 
sceptical about territorial reforms, in 1998 it introduced a new level of administration, the 
development regions (Birnir 2007: 125). The centre-right parties had a less radical tone 
towards the ethnic minorities than the nationalists, but as the nationalist parties were 
campaigning on ethnic and territorial issues, they could certainly not afford any other position 
than defending the unitary state: "Recognition of minority rights does not imply denying our 
territorial integrity and the unitary feature of the Romanian state" (CDR - 1992). "In its fight 
for diversity, the USD rejects ethnic based autonomy or enclavisation [i.e. Hungarian self-
government in Covasna and Harghita]" (USD - 1996). 
In 1996, the rhetoric of the main mainstream parties converged. The Social Democrats 
(PSD, earlier running under the labels FSN, FDSN, PDSR), after the break-up of the coalition 
with the nationalists, and in a period where the Romanian mainstream parties were turning 
towards Europe, adopted a more accommodative position: The state shall ensure "a 
favourable framework for community development in the communities at local and national 
levels", but "without leading to secession or ethnic autonomy" (PDSR – 2000). Not longer in 
coalition with the nationalists, and equipped with a new pro-European agenda, the electoral 
and ideological constraints on the party’s regionalisation policy were relaxed. Nevertheless, 
the party still would not allow for any substantial policy concessions on the question of 
territorial reforms, even not after 2000, when it was governing jointly with the UDMR. The 
UDMR's proposition of regional reforms was blocked in parliament by its senior coalition 
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partner in 2003 and 2004.15 Survey results show that a Hungarian autonomous region would 
have been completely unacceptable to voters of all Romanian parties – whereas a general 
increase of (non-ethnically defined) local autonomy was more acceptable.16 This also means 
that parties in government (but likewise the non-nationalist mainstream parties in opposition) 
might have feared making too large concessions to the Hungarian minority on territorial 
issues.  
This hostility has persisted during the 2000s, when mainstream parties issued 
statements on different forms of ethnic autonomy in response to several events, which 
revealed their continued opposition to accommodation. During the declaration of 
independence in Kosovo, they opposed the ethnic Hungarian parties’ attempt to draw parallel 
between Kosovo and the Hungarian enclaves of Romania17 They also opposed the announced 
referendum on the formation of the Szekler region (Ţinutul Secuiesc-Székelyföld).18 Also, 
they reacted against the publication of a European Parliament report in 2005, suggesting 
cultural autonomy for Romania's minorities.  
As figure 1 shows, in 2011, Romanian mainstream parties (PSD, PD-L and PNL) are 
almost unanimous in their rejection of any autonomy claims. Certainly, the inclusion into 
governments limits the possibilities how parties can position themselves. Especially, as 
Romanian mainstream parties were usually in coalition with the Hungarian minority party 
(UDMR), they tend towards slightly more pragmatic on ethnically sensitive issues, such as 
advocating decentralisation or regionalisation, but without creating Hungarian-majority 
regions. The ultra-nationalists (PRM) remain the fiercest antagonist to any regionalisation. 
Controversies are rather of a rhetorical nature, and while the PRM is firmly rejecting any of 
                                                 
15 Romania libera, 21 November 2003, "Proiectul de lege privind autonomia Tarii Secuilor, respins de PSD, 
neagreat de UDMR. [The PSD rejects the bill for autonomy for the Szeklerland, not agreed by the UDMR"; 
Romania libera, 20 December 2004, "PSD sustine ca a refuzat solicitarea privind autonomia Tinutului Secuiesc 
[PSD asserts that it rejected the demand for autonomy for the Szeklerland]" 
16 Analysis of two questions of the Ethnobarometer of 2000 (CCRIT 2000). This is one of the rare surveys 
containing questions on territorial issues. 
17 Balkan Insight, 3 February 2009, "Romania Opposes Collective Minority Rights" 
18 Romania libera, 21 November 2011, "Dispută pentru autonomia secuilor. [Fight over the Szekler autonomy.]" 
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the "recommendations" issued by European institutions, the governmental parties stress their 
commitment to a decentralist policy: "we started a process of reinforcement of local self-
government. [...] Not only ethnic groups need autonomy" (Traian Băsescu, PD leader and 
state president).19 A suggestion by the PD of 2011 to create eight regions was vetoed by the 
coalition partner UDMR, which considered the regions as too large – not allowing the 
creation of a region with a Hungarian autonomy.20 Figure 1 displays the diverging views of 
the Hungarian minority parties on territorial autonomy. 
0=unitarists 10=autonomi
Territorial autonomy
PCM‐MPP
UDMR
PRM
PNL
PD‐L
PSD
Romania, 2011
 
Figure 1: Position of the main parties on territorial issues in Romania, 2011. Source: Szöcsik & Zuber (forthcoming) 
Median party position and 25%-75% percentiles.  
 
 
Slovakia 
 
Territorial reforms 
Slovakia has undergone three major territorial reforms. First, the responsibilities of 
municipal governments vis-à-vis the state administration were defined and their direct 
                                                 
19 Romania libera, 21 January 2011, "Traian Băsescu: Nu îmbrăţişăm teoria autonomiei pe criterii etnice; am 
trecut la creşterea autonomiei locale [Traian Băsescu: We do not embrace autonomy according to ethnic criteria, 
we opt for increased local autonomy]", quoting Băsescu's statement in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
20 RTV.net, 9 January 2012, "Meciul PDL-UDMR pe reorganizare. Fiecare, cu placa lui [PDL-UDMR match 
over reorganisation. Each, as he pleases]" 
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elections were introduced in 1990 (Krivý 1997: 95). Between 1991 and 1996, the country, 
was divided into 4 regions (kraje) with 38 districts (okresy) and 121 sub districts (obvody).  
Second, the third government of Vladimír Mečiar (1994-1998) transformed this 
territorial organisation in 1996 and created eight administrative regions (krajov) and 79 
districts (okresy). The eight regions were mostly stretched in a North-South direction, 
ensuring that none of them had any considerable share of ethnic Hungarians and, out of the 
ten districts with Hungarian majority, only two remained (Mezei and Hardi 2003: 133; Krivý 
1997: 94). The reform was aimed at centralising and consolidating the power of the state 
administration at the expense of local independent governments and the Hungarian minority 
parties. According to prime minister Mečiar, it “would prevent any kind of Hungarian 
aspiration to autonomy once and for all” (Szarka 2002: 123).  
The third major administrative reform took place in 2001 under the first term of the 
liberal government of Mikuláš Dzurinda. It created a regional tier of government, involving 
the transfer of competences from the state administration to municipalities and regions, 
continuing the Slovak dual model of administration, where decentralised offices of the central 
administration, co-exist with autonomous authorities at the regional and local level The 
reform created 8 self-governed regions (samosprávne kraje), with 79 districts (okresy), and 
the first regional elections for the regional self-government bodies were held at the end of 
2001 (Nižnansky and Pilát 2002; Buček 2002). Importantly, regions with Hungarian 
majorities were, once again, not created. 
 
Ethnic minority parties 
At the beginning of the 1990s, three parliamentary parties represented the Hungarian 
minority all of which called for collective rights and elaborated their own autonomy plans. 
The Hungarian parties’ aspiration for territorial autonomy culminated in a gathering of 
Hungarian local mayors and representatives in 1994, in which all three endorsed an 
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administrative reform that would guarantee self-government for the regions with Hungarian 
majorities in southern Slovakia (Szarka 2002: 128).  
The administrative reform of the Mečiar government was rejected by the Hungarian 
minority parties, but they were in opposition and without political influence. The EU was also 
sceptical about the territorial-administrative reform but its criticism only referred to the high 
degree of centralisation of regional decision-making. No comment was made on the 
gerrymandering that intended to decrease the influence of the Hungarian minority (Hughes et 
al. 2004: 91). Like Romania, Slovakia also concluded a friendship treaty with Hungary, which 
excluded the possibility of territorial autonomy (Roper 2000: 121; Eplényi 2006: 64-5; Csergő 
2002: 17). After the electoral law was altered in 1998, increasing the threshold for alliances of 
political parties, the Hungarian parties (previously competing in an alliance in national 
elections) merged into a single party, the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK).  
The SMK was included in the coalition government led by the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition (SDK) of Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda (1998-2002) on the condition that the 
party renounced its most controversial claim - territorial autonomy on ethnic basis (Szarka 
2002: 128). The party moved instead towards an agenda of administrative reforms 
(Hamberger 2004: 107), including the creation of the county Komarno, with a Hungarian 
majority, separate from the 12 that were already created. But, the 2001 administrative reform 
did not consider these claims, and was a severe defeat for the SMK, which provoked internal 
quarrels. The SMK criticised its coalition partners for triggering a governmental crisis and 
delaying the EU accession process of Slovakia (Szarka 2002: 130), but in the end, it had to 
give in, since its coalition partners had not even wanted to support the reorganisation into 12 
counties, but wanted to keep the existing eight regions 2001 (Buček 2002: 151). The second 
SDK-led coalition government (2002-2006) was once again unwilling to compromise on this 
issue, but instead gratified the SMK with the establishment of an independent Hungarian 
university in Komarno (Jarábik 2003: 148; Hamberger 2004: 111). Extra-parliamentary 
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associations started to address the territorial issue, but did not succeed in mobilizing the 
Hungarian minority (Šutaj and Sápos 2008: 44-7; 2009: 27-31). 
When the SMK relapsed in opposition in 2006, its new leadership elaborated a proposition on 
the restitution to the victims of the Beneš decrees which triggered massive internal and 
external critique. Eventually, the new party Most–Híd was founded in 2009 by dissident 
members of the SMK who were dissatisfied with the course of the SMK in the opposition. . 
Most–Híd’s goal is to establish as a multi-national, multi-cultural and a multi-lingual state. 
Demands of territorial autonomy did not make it into the party program and its leader openly 
stated that there is no demand for territorial autonomy on the side of the Hungarian minority 
in Slovakia.21 Therefore, the leadership of the Most–Híd clearly broke with the SMK’s 
tradition to support territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The new 
party outperformed the old one in the 2010 parliamentary elections, and is the only ethnic 
minority party that passed the electoral threshold and is in parliament and the coalition 
government with the SDKU-DS, KDH and the SaS. Early national elections in 2012 
replicated the results of the national elections in 2010, with Most–Híd entering  parliament, 
while SMK failed to pass the electoral threshold. 
  
Mainstream parties 
Ethno-territorial autonomy is a salient issue  in Slovak politics, but it is largely 
opposed by all mainstream parties addressing the Slovak majority. The main nationalist party, 
the Slovak National Party (SNS) predominantly campaigns on nation- and minority-related 
topics, including the issue of Slovak unity. However, the nationalist-authoritarian Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the left-wing Smer, which turned nationalist in the 2000s, 
and the liberal Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) have also repeatedly rejected any form of 
ethno-territorial autonomy.  
                                                 
21 Új Szó, 21 August 2010, "Pravda: A magyarok az autonómiára emlékeztették Pozsonyt [Pravda: The 
Hungarians reminded Bratislava of autonomy]". 
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Nevertheless – and despite the two Hungarian minority parties have renounced to 
demands for autonomy, the 'forbidden issue' nourishes struggles among the mainstream 
parties. Nationalist parties repeatedly attempted to portray the danger of Hungarian minority 
representatives, and the threat of autonomy for the national unity of Slovakia (see also 
Deegan-Krause 2004). In 1996, after a meeting in Budapest between the Hungarian 
government, parliamentary officials and representatives of Hungarian minorities abroad, a 
statement was issued that "The establishment of local governments and autonomy - in line 
with current European practice and the spirit of international norms - is vital to preserving the 
identity of Hungarians beyond the borders." The HZDS asked for legal action against the 
ethnic Hungarian deputies taking part in the Budapest meeting,22 and a HZDS member of 
parliament, Dušan Slobodník, warned of irredentist elements who "say we are loyal Slovak 
citizens, [...] but what they wish is to renew Greater Hungary." 23 And an HZDS spokesman 
Vladimír Hagara: "The Hungarian nationality is very dangerous. [...] They want not only their 
Magyar language, but then their own land, then their own government, then their land will 
join Hungary. [...] [The Hungarians] are very aggressive when they have an advantage over 
you. Just look at history."24 
The nationalist parties' positions have affected the position of the other mainstream 
parties. Both nationalists and parties in opposition have made clear in several instances, that if 
a mainstream party – especially those in government – should deviate from the common view 
of national interests, they will present them as betrayers of the Slovak people. The HZDS has 
even spread fake leaflets in the 2009 election campaigns, stating that its adversary would 
support autonomy for the ethnic Hungarians– which is obviously a potentially seriously 
                                                 
22 Slovak Spectator, 17 July 1996, "Budapest declaration on autonomy rouses tornado of ire"; Slovak Spectator, 
24 January 2005, "'Autonomy' trips response" 
23 Slovak Spectator, 18 December 1997, "Hungarian coalition pledges cooperation with SDK" 
24 Slovak Spectator, 4 December 1997, "Hungarians replace 'autonomy' rhetoric with 'decentralization'" 
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damaging message in Slovak politics.25 Speaking in the words of the chairman of a minor 
party of the centre-right, Ján Langoš (DS), "the term [autonomy] itself is becoming a problem 
in Slovakia because Hungarian parties want autonomy, and we reject it as political concept. I 
don't see a reason for someone having special rights when they live on Slovak land."26 
Slovak governments have therefore avoided any kind of autonomy solution, and all 
larger mainstream parties have considered autonomy as unacceptable.27 However, 
governments pursued different agendas of decentralisation, depending on whether they were 
nationalist (1994-8 and 2006-10), or liberal and including the Hungarian minority party 
(1998-2006). The Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) of Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda 
(1998-2006), was advocating a model of decentralisation with 12 new self-governed regions, 
while junior parties and the oppositional HZDS wanted to keep the previous regional structure 
with eight regions. None of these propositions, however, contained an ethnically defined 
territorial unit, and the dispute was not fought along ethnic and nationalist lines. Instead, the 
governing SDK explained that their reform would strengthen democracy and bring the 
country closer to EU accession. The proposition of the Hungarian minority party (SMK) to 
initiate an ethnically demarcated county (Komarno) was met by fierce opposition both within 
the coalition and by the opposition.28 
This ideological hostility has persisted and there was little change in the positions of 
the mainstream parties in the 2000s. As figure 2 demonstrates, in 2011 as in the case of 
Romania, the mainstream parties (SMER-SD, SDKÚ-DS and the KDH) are clearly against 
territorial autonomy but might became slightly more willing to compromise. Consistent with 
its liberal program, Freedom and Liberty (SaS), a young political party, takes the most 
friendly toward territorial autonomy for the Hungarians. The ultra-nationalists SNS remained 
                                                 
25 Slovak Spectator, 18 December 1997, "Hungarian coalition pledges cooperation with SDK"; Slovak Spectator, 
30 March 2009, "Mečiar says fake leaflets on Radičová's behalf are provocation" 
26 Slovak Spectator, 17 July 1996, "Opposition trio agrees to integrate". 
27 Slovak Spectator, 24 January 2005, "'Autonomy' trips response". 
28 Slovak Spectator, 17 July 1996, "Opposition trio agrees to integrate"; Slovak Spectator, 12 March 2001, 
"Coalition digs in for long-haul reform". See also Buček (2002: 150-1). 
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a fierce protagonist of a unitarian state. However, in the 2000s, decentralisation became 
increasingly a topic of dispute between national and local politics, with the Association of 
Towns and Cities (ZMOS) as the main actor. Even nationalists would take the side of the 
local administration (and fiscal decentralisation) if they are in opposition at the national 
level.29 Finally, figure 2 displays the intra-Hungarian competition between the SMK and 
Most–Híd regarding the claim of territorial autonomy. 
 
Figure 2: Position of the main parties on territorial issues in Slovakia, 2011. Source: Szöcsik & Zuber (forthcoming) 
Median party position and 25%-75% percentiles.  
Conclusion 
The, regionalisation of the new EU member states has only advanced very slowly, if at all. 
While the previous literature has put an accent on the EU's role in driving territorial reforms, 
this paper takes into account the domestic actors' perspective. The EU did not prescribe a 
model of regionalisation and it did not promote ethno-territorial autonomy as an instrument of 
minority protection during the accession process. Therefore, the political parties had the 
power to define the model of territorial reforms  
In Romania and Slovakia, ethnic Hungarian parties have called for territorial 
autonomy and the formation of regions with a Hungarian majority. For the mainstream 
parties, however, this type of territorial reforms remain taboo. Historical legacies of unstable 
                                                 
29 Slovak Spectator, 17 October 2011, "Changes proposed in local government revenue sources" 
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and contested borders invoke the fear that the establishment of territorial autonomies for the 
Hungarian minority might endanger the territorial integrity of their states. Nationalist parties 
of the majority have put an emphasis on the ethno-national issue-dimension to mobilise 
voters. This has limited the space of manoeuvre of other mainstream parties too, hindering 
them from taking substantial steps towards regionalisation. Instead, and over the course of 
time, the civic parties have moved towards weaker models of territorial reforms, which have 
fulfilled EU requirements, while avoiding any kind of ethnically-based autonomy. As a 
consequence of their different governmental-oppositional role, the reactions of the ethnic 
minority parties have been mixed. In both countries, the dominant Hungarian minority party 
have dropped the issue of autonomy from its agenda to get into government. While in 
Slovakia, the party had split while staying in opposition, and the challenger took a moderate 
turn, in Romania, the UDMR was challenged from the radical side, and the new Hungarian 
minority parties revitalized the territorial issue (Bochsler and Szöcsik 2012). 
In brief, we argue that the history makes ethno-territorial reforms a very sensitive issue 
in domestic politics in the two countries. During EU access negotiations, the governmental 
parties came under pressure to find a suitable solution to decentralise, but party competition 
restricted their space of manoeuvre, as nationalist parties of the ethnic majority would 
immediately capitalise on too large steps towards an regionalisation with ethnic traits. 
The two case studies put forward new suggestions for the comparative study of 
regionalisation. In multi-ethnic states in Central and Eastern Europe, the support of 
mainstream parties for regionalisation is not rewarding electorally, and territorial reforms lack 
substantial domestic support among the ethnic majority. 
The patterns that emerge in this study might be applicable to other countries of the 
region. There are indeed certain parallels to the solution that was adopted in the Ohrid 
framework agreement to resolve the ethnic conflict in Macedonia. There, a form of 
decentralisation was agreed which does not lead to the creation of an Albanian entity, but 
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strengthened the municipal authorities instead, in many points comparable to the solution for 
the Serbian dominated municipalities in Kosovo. While the process of territorial reforms is 
still going on in Serbia, the debate very much follows the lines outlined in our article. 
Interestingly, an autonomy solution could so far only be reached for the case with a clear 
Serbian majority among the population (Vojvodina), where also the risk of separatism is 
perceived lowest, while the regions in which the minority constitute a majority (Preševo 
valley, Sandžak) have not gained any territorial autonomy. The only exceptions to the rule 
might be two war-torn countries, where autonomy solutions are the result of concessions 
reached in peace negotiations after violent conflicts: in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the federal 
structure was brokered in the Dayton peace agreement. In Moldova the minority-inhabited 
region of Gagauzia was granted asymmetric autonomy shortly after the violent break-away of 
Transnistria. No wonder that with the exception of these two cases, only decentralisation and 
an absence of territorial reforms with strong regions can be observed throughout the region. 
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